With the rise of investment treaties, investor-state arbitration became the main solution to adjudicate the investment disputes and therefor diplomatic protection claims have declined in numbers. Most investment treaties also provide that each treaty party can bring a state-state arbitral claim against another treaty party concerning disputes about the interpretation or application of the treaty. Furthermore, home state of investor can bring a diplomatic protection claim for violations suffered by it's nationals against the host state. As there is an applicable investment treaty between the dispute's parties, this kind of diplomatic protection claims is subject to distinct rules and prerequisites, governed by the treaty rather than by customary international law. A peculiar focus is placed hereby on the necessity to exhaust local remedies before proceedings may be initiated and on mixed claims that entail espoused claims as well as claims for an own and direct violation of the state.

International investment law now recognises the right of foreign investors to bring a claim directly against host states. This right is often provided in multilateral or bilateral investment treaties. However, this principle is now under threat by measures known under the term of "Treaty Shopping" taken by investors to take advantage of investment treaties between host states and countries other than national states of investors.in order to benefit from these treaties, investors have devised means to acquire the nationality of states that have signed the target treaty with host states. These conducts are sometimes taken by ingenious investors as well. Host states have designed various means to confront treaty shopping. One of these solutions is drafting treaties in a manner that prevents wrongful benefit of investors without the nationality of states that have signed favourable treaties with host states, before any dispute arises and be taken to arbitration. The insertion of "Denial of Benefits Clause" in investment treaties is one of these methods. This paper studies the concept, history and evolution of this clause in light of practice in order to determine its level of efficiency in preventing treaty shopping.

Intellectual property constitutes one of the key protected assets of foreign investors within host countries, as recognized in most international investment treaties. These treaties generally include provisions safeguarding the intellectual property rights of investors. However, such protections are not absolute; they may be subject to limitations imposed by the public interests of the host states. Incorporating exemption clauses into international investment agreements exemplifies such limitations. According to these clauses, actions undertaken by host countries to safeguard public interests are not deemed breaches of the investor’s rights. In practice, host countries often invoke such exemption clauses, frequently through measures like issuing compulsory licenses, which impose restrictions on the intellectual property rights of investors. Such actions may be interpreted by investors as expropriation of their intellectual property, potentially giving rise to claims for compensation. This article examines whether, in accordance with the content of foreign investment treaties, international conventions, and domestic laws pertaining to intellectual property, a foreign investor is legally entitled to such claims. It also analyzes the likelihood of success, considering possible defenses that the host country might raise. Employing an analytical-descriptive methodology, this study concludes that the determination of such claims largely hinges on two factors: (1) the amount of royalty paid to the inventor, and (2) the specific language of exemption clauses within the investment treaties.

In recent decades, bilateral and multilateral investment treaties have become key international legal tools to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) by providing protections that attract foreign investors. Consequently, many developing countries enter into bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to boost FDI inflows. This study aims to investigate the impact of these treaties on FDI in developing countries, analyzing economic data from 21 developing nations from 2007 to 2022 through an attraction model. The findings indicate that BITs have a consistently positive and significant impact on FDI across all models, with a particularly strong effect observed among developing countries. Additional variables—including institutional quality, colonial ties, and a free trade agreement dummy variable—were added to the model. When a BIT is concluded, the host country provides foreign investors with a reliable institutional framework that may offer better investment protection than domestic institutions. In this context, BITs and domestic institutional quality appear to be substitutes, leading to an expected negative relationship. On the other hand, BITs can also serve as a signaling mechanism, indicating to foreign investors that the host country is committed to safeguarding their investments. To capture this effect, an interaction term between BITs and institutional quality was added to the model. This interaction variable is negative across most country pairs, indicating substitutability, but is positive and significant among pairs of developing countries, highlighting a unique dynamic in these contexts.

Foreign investment has many positive effects on the host countries. Attracting foreign investment through technology transfer and increasing competitiveness in the business environment probably lead to increasing economic growth and reducing poverty. Developing countries have always been trying to attract more foreign investment by providing the necessary conditions and increasing their competitiveness. In this regard, the governments of these countries have used various initiatives such as signing bilateral investment treaties as a reliable tool to encourage and promote foreign investment. This study has been compiled with the aim of investigating the impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign investment in Iran. To achieve this purpose, the gravity model approach and the panel data model in the period of 2002 to 2020 have been used. The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship between signing bilateral investment treaties and the attraction of foreign investment in Iran. Because the sanctions imposed against Iran foreign investment inflows to Iran have significantly reduced. In addition, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the variables of the existence of common language, as well as the real GDP of the home countries and the attraction of foreign investment in Iran

Despite periodic efforts to codify the international rules governing flows of foreign investment in a single multilateral instrument, these rules continue to exist in a bewildering patchwork of bilateral and regional treaties which have proliferated since the late 1950s. With regard to the lack of such a comprehensive codified law on foreign investment, Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) came into existence in order to provide more protection for foreign investment. These treaties impose further obligations on the host States in order to ensure the security of the foreign investor. However, the host States are obliged simultaneously to respect and protect human rights. Thus, it seems that the controversy lies in the interplay of fundamental human rights obligations in BITs which have brought negative impacts on human rights issues thereof.

This study aims at investigating the impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign investment inflows into Iran from developed source countries. To achieve this purpose, the two common approach in foreign investment literature, that is, the gravity and knowledge-capital model has been used as the analytical framework of the study, as well as the pseudo-Poisson maximum likelihood method for the years 2002-2020. The results show that both gravity and knowledge-capital models provide an acceptable explanation of foreign investment inflows into Iran from developed countries. Except of Iran's real GDP, the main variables of the gravity model, that is, the geographical distance and real GDP of developed source countries are statistically significant and have the expected signs. All the main variables of the knowledge-capital model, including the difference between gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education of developed source countries and Iran (with a negative coefficient), sum of real GDP of developed source countries and Iran (with a positive coefficient) as well as Interaction of the difference between gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education of developed source countries and Iran and difference between real GDP of developed source countries and Iran (with a positive coefficient) are statistically significant and indicate that the foreign investment of developed countries in Iran is more horizontal than vertical. There is a positive and statistically significant relationship between bilateral investment treaties and foreign investment inflows into Iran from developed source countries in both gravity and knowledge-capital models. Finally, the sanctions imposed against Iran have reduced foreign investment inflows into the country.

At first, it was assumed that the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine exists only in the human rights treaties and particularly in the European Convention on Human Rights, while the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine is considered as a right for States in many non-human rights treaties due to specific conditions and rules that govern some international treaties such as the existence of optional obligations or ambiguity, insertion of non-precluded measures clauses and existence of positive obligations. Therefore, in international treaties, the granting of this right to States would enable them to choose and adopt the best decision, according to the circumstances and necessities related to the public interest. Accordingly, the traditional views which believed in the conflict of the margin of appreciation doctrine with adherence to international obligations have been adjusted. There are concerns about the abuse of freedom of action, and powers granted to the States, that leads to an opposition with authorities granted under the framework of the margin of appreciation doctrine to States. Of course, these concerns were obviated somewhat with regard to the fact that, international judicial courts have relied on review standards to supervise on State powers.

In recent decades, international investment treaties have faced significant criticism for imposing restrictions on governmental regulatory rights and the implementation of public policies, particularly within the framework of public law related to human rights and public interests. The primary issue of this research, from the perspective of public law, is to examine the extent to which human rights considerations and public interests are reflected in investment treaties, especially Iran's bilateral investment treaties, and to achieve a balance between the public obligations of states in safeguarding public interests and human rights on one hand, and the protection of foreign investors' rights on the other. This article, utilizing a descriptive-analytical method and a comparative approach within the framework of public law, examines and analyzes the provisions of Iran's investment treaties and compares them with modern international treaties such as CETA, CEPA, and European and American models. The research findings indicate that Iran's investment treaties, compared to the new generation of treaties, pay less attention to public law principles such as governmental regulatory rights, compliance with human rights, and sustainable development goals, which could limit the public sovereignty of the state in the face of foreign investment requirements. Furthermore, this article examines the status of Iran's investment treaties and their challenges in protecting human rights and public interests from a public law viewpoint. It also analyzes how experiences from modern international treaties can be utilized to improve Iran's investment treaties and establish a balance between investors' rights and the human rights and public obligations of states.

The settlement of investment disputes between the investor and the host government due to the violation of the investment treaty is subject to the rules governing the dispute settlement clause under the relevant treaty. Among these criteria is the condition of the Cooling-Off Period, the observance of which as a form of jurisdictional procedure and a prerequisite stage for dispute resolution, is directly related to the jurisdiction of courts or arbitration tribunals. According to this condition, the claimant of an investment dispute should refrain from filing a lawsuit in court for a certain period. The parties should do their best to resolve the dispute amicably. The main question of the research is, what will the effects and results be if the investor or the host government does not comply with the waiting period? Different courts have different opinions in this regard, according to some, non-compliance with this condition has no effect on the jurisdiction and is an optional procedure, while others emphasize that it is mandatory and effective in the court's jurisdiction and even the possibility of compensation. The review of the authors with a descriptive and analytical approach shows that determining whether this condition is mandatory will depend on the review of the text of the treaty, the rules governing the relevant investment, and the extent of the language of the text.